Surinderjit Singh Mand
and Anr vs State Of Punjab and Anr on 5th July 2016 in the Supreme Court of
India.
Sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is mandatory even in cases where the cognizance is taken by the Court under Section 319 Cr.P.C
Sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is mandatory even in cases where the cognizance is taken by the Court under Section 319 Cr.P.C
_____________________________________________________________
The Electricity
(Supply) Act, 1948:
Section 7, Section 10, Section
11, Section 13, Section 15, Section 19, Section 36, Section
49, Section 50
The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973:
Section 197, Section
197(1), Section 319,
The Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988:
Section 5(1), Section
6(1), Section
7, Section 10, Section 11, Section 13, Section 13(2),
Section 15, Section 19
The Indian Penal Code:
Section 406, Section 498A
The Constitution of
India 1949:
Article 14, Article 32,
Article 226, Article 356
K. Satwant Singh vs The
State Of Punjab (And Connected ... on 28 October, 1959 -- Supreme Court of
India
Harihar Prasad, Etc. vs
State Of Bihar on 7 September, 1971 -- Supreme Court of India
B. Saha And Ors vs M.
S. Kochar on 27 July, 1979 -- Supreme Court of India
Jaswant Singh Nerwal
Etc vs State Of Punjab And Ors. Etc on 14 February, 1991 -- Supreme Court of
India
R.Balakrishna Pillai vs
State Of Kerala & Anr on 5 December, 1995 -- Supreme Court of India
State Through CBI vs
Raj Kumar Jain on 4 August, 1998 -- Supreme Court of India
Pp Unnikrishnan And
Another vs Puttiyottil Alikutty Anr Another on 5 September, 2000 -- Supreme
Court of India
P K Pradhan vs The
State Of Sikkim Represented By ... on 24 July, 2001 -- Supreme Court of India
State Of Orissa Through
Kumar ... vs Genesh Chandra Jew on 24 March, 2004 -- Supreme Court of India
State Of Goa vs Babu
Thomas on 29 September, 2005 -- Supreme Court of India
Dilawar Singh vs
Parvinder Singh @ Iqbal Singh & Anr on 8 November, 2005 -- Supreme Court of
India
Sankaran Moitra vs Smt.
Sadhna Das & Anr on 24 March, 2006 -- Supreme Court of India
Paul Varghese vs State
Of Kerala And Anr on 10 April, 2007 -- Supreme Court of India
O Dr.
Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr on 31 January, 2012 -- Supreme
Court of India m Prakash & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 26
September, 2012 -- Supreme Court of India
Hori Ram Singh vs
King-Emperor on 18 January, 1940 -- Bombay High Court
Usharani vs The
Commissioner Of Police on 22 March, 2016 -- Madras High Court
__________________________________________________________
“REPORTABLE”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.565 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.3406 of 2008)
SURINDERJIT SINGH MAND
& ANR.
.......APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB &
ANR. .......RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Jagdish Singh Khehar,
J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Surinderjit Singh
Mand and P.S. Parmar, the appellants before this Court, while holding the rank
of Deputy Superintendent of Police, were posted in District Kapurthala, in the
State of Punjab, during the relevant period in 1999. Piara Lal (holding the
rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector), was also posted at Kapurthala, at the same
time. The above mentioned Piara Lal’s son - Neeraj Kumar was officially
arrested on 28.06.1999. The arrest of Neeraj Kumar, was made in furtherance of
a First Information Report bearing No.30, which was registered at Police
Station City, Kapurthala on 03.03.1999. Before the arrest of Neeraj Kumar, his
father Piara Lal was placed under suspension on 10.06.1999. The aforesaid FIR
No.30, we were informed, was in respect of complaints made by residents of
Kapurthala, pertaining to theft of motorcycles and other vehicles in the city.
3. It was pointed out,
that while investigating into the allegations contained in the complaint dated
03.03.1999, three persons including Neeraj Kumar were arrested on 28.06.1999.
Neeraj Kumar was granted bail on 30.06.1999. In the above view of the matter,
it is apparent that Neeraj Kumar had remained in jail for just about two/three
days (from 28.06.1999 to 30.06.1999). Usha Rani - mother of Neeraj Kumar
(detained during the investigation of FIR No. 30), filed a representation
asserting, that her son had been detained on 24.06.1999 (and not on 28.06.1999,
as alleged). That would make the duration of his arrest as of six/seven days.
The present controversy pertains to the additional four/five days of the arrest
of Neeraj Kumar. Her complaint highlighted, that her son – Neeraj Kumar was
apprehended illegally and unauthorisedly for the period from 24.06.1999 to
28.06.1999 i.e., for four/five days.
4. Investigation into
the complaint made by Usha Rani, was directed to be conducted in the first
instance, by Munish Chawla, IPS. In the report submitted by him, it was
concluded, that the charge levelled by the mother of Neeraj Kumar, could not be
substantiated. Yet again, based on the accusations levelled by Usha Rani,
another investigation was ordered. This time, it was required to be conducted
by M.F. Farooqi, IPS. Yet again, in the second enquiry, it was concluded, that
there was no material to establish that Neeraj Kumar had been in police
detention from 24.06.1999 onwards, till his formal arrest on 28.06.1999.
Despite the two reports submitted by two senior police officers, wherein it was
found that there was no substance in the allegations levelled by Usha Rani,
Gurpreet Deo, IPS, at her own, investigated into the matter. She too arrived at
the same conclusion, that there was no substance in the claim of Usha Rani,
that her son had been illegally and unauthorisedly detained by police
personnel, prior to his formal arrest on 28.06.1999.
5. Usha Rani (mother of
Neeraj Kumar) made another written complaint, this time to the Hon'ble
Administrative Judge (a sitting Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court)
having charge of Sessions Division, Kapurthala, on 01.10.1999. In her
complaint, she reiterated, that her son Neeraj Kumar had been illegally
detained by police personnel, on 24.06.1999. The Hon'ble Administrative Judge
marked the complaint, dated 01.10.1999, to an Additional District and Sessions
Judge, posted in the Sessions Division of Kapurthala, requiring him to look
into the matter. On 25.09.2000, the concerned Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Kapurthala, submitted a report concluding, that Neeraj Kumar had been
falsely implicated, because he and some other accused had been discharged by a
Court, from the proceedings initiated against them. Based on the aforesaid
report dated 25.09.2000, First Information Report bearing No.46, came to be
registered at Police Station City Kapurthala, on 22.10.2002.
6. After completion of
police investigation in the above FIR No.46, a chargesheet was filed against
six police officials, in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala,
on 25.05.2003. Before the aforesaid chargesheet was filed, the prosecution had
obtained sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as, the ‘Code’) for prosecuting the six concerned
police officials. It is also relevant to mention, that it was the express
contention of the appellants, that on the conclusion of investigation, no
involvement of the appellants had emerged, and therefore, their names were
recorded in Column No.2. It was submitted, that the aforesaid depiction of the
names of the appellants in Column No.2 by itself, demonstrates their innocence
(with reference to the allegations made by Usha Rani, that her son Neeraj Kumar
had been illegally detained from 24.06.1999).
7. It is not a matter
of dispute, that after the statements of three prosecution witnesses were
recorded by the trial Court, Usha Rani moved an application under Section 319
of the ‘Code’ before the trial Judge – the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Kapurthala, for taking cognizance against the appellants herein. The aforesaid
application was allowed by the trial Court, on 06.09.2003. Thereupon, the
appellants were summoned by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala, to face
trial. The appellants contested their summoning before the trial Court by
asserting, that their prosecution was unsustainable in law, because no sanction
had been obtained by the prosecution under Section 197 of the ‘Code’, before
cognizance was taken against them.
8. Consequent upon the
appellants having been summoned by the trial Court, charges were framed against
them on 23.12.2006. The order passed by the trial Court framing charges against
the appellants on 23.12.2006 was assailed by the appellants, through Criminal
Revision No.348 of 2007. The primary submission advanced on behalf of the
appellants before the High Court was, that the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Kapurthala, could not have proceeded against them, in the absence of sanction
of prosecution, under Section 197 of the ‘Code’. The High Court, by its order dated
09.01.2008, dismissed the Criminal Revision filed by the appellants. The above
order dated 09.01.2008 is subject matter of challenge through the instant
appeal.
9. Mr. Ram Jethmalani,
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, in order to
support the claim of the appellants, has drawn our attention to Section 197 of
the ‘Code’, which is extracted hereunder:
“197. Prosecution of
Judges and public servants.
(1) When any person who
is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his
office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence
alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence
except with the previous sanction (save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and
Lokayuktas Act, 2013)-
(a) in the case of a
person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of
the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of
the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a
person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of
the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the
State Government:
Provided that where the
alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the
period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the
Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression
"State Government" occurring therein, the expression "Central
Government" were substituted.
XXX XXX XXX
(4) The Central
Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the
person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the
prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and
may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held.” (emphasis is ours)
The learned senior
counsel highlighted, that sanction under Section 197 of the ‘Code’ is
mandatory, where the concerned public servant is alleged to have committed an
offence “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty”.
10. In order to
demonstrate the ambit and scope of the term “while acting or purporting to act
in the discharge of his official duty”, learned senior counsel placed reliance
on Dr. Hori Ram Singh vs. Emperor, AIR (1939) FC 43, wherein the Court has
observed as under:
“But Sec.477-A in
express terms covers the case of an officer, who willfully falsifies accounts
which may be his duty to maintain. They have apparently put theft,
embezzlement, or breach of trust on exactly the same footing as falsification
of accounts, and have not considered the charge of falsifying the accounts separately
from that of criminal breach of trust. This is ignoring the significance of the
words “purporting to be done” which are no less important. They have thought
that an act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty as a
servant of the Crown cannot by any stretching of the English language be made
to apply to an act which is clearly a dereliction of his duty as such. But if
an act has purported to be done in execution of duty, it may be done so, only
ostensibly and not really, and if done dishonestly may still be a dereliction
of duty. The High Court Bench have taken the view that the Section is clearly
meant to apply to an act by a public servant which could be done in good faith,
but which possibly might also be done in bad faith.....The Section cannot be
meant to apply to cases where there could be no doubt that the act alleged must
be in bad faith.
So far as sub-s. (1) is
concerned, the question of good faith or bad faith cannot strictly arise, for
the words used are not only “any act done in the execution of his duty” but
also “any act purporting to be done in the execution of his duty.” When an act
is not done in the execution of his duty, but purports to have been done in the
execution of his duty, it may very well be done in bad faith; and even an act
which cannot at all be done in execution of duty if another is made to believe
wrongly that it was being done in execution of duty. It is therefore not
possible to restrict the applicability of the Section to only such cases where
an act could possibly have been done both in good and bad faith. Of course, the
question of good or bad faith cannot be gone into at the early stage at which
objection may be taken. Making false entries in a register may well be an act
purported to be done in execution of duty, which would be an offence, although
it can never be done in good faith. It is sub-sec. (2) only which introduces
the element of good faith, which relieves the Court of its obligation to
dismiss the proceedings. But that sub-section relates to cases even previously
instituted and in which there may not be a defect of want of consent, and is
therefore quite distinct and separate, and not merely ancillary to sub-s.(1),
as the learned Sessions Judge supposed. Having regard to the ordinary and natural
meaning of the words “purporting to be done,” it is difficult to say that it
necessarily implies “purporting to be done in good faith,” for a person who
ostensibly acts in execution of his duty still purports so to act, although he
may have a dishonest intention.”
(emphasis is ours)
Reliance was also
placed on Sankaran Moitra vs. Sadhna Das, (2006) 4 SCC 584, wherefrom our
attention was drawn to the following paragraph:
“25. The High Court has
stated that killing of a person by use of excessive force could never be
performance of duty. It may be correct so far as it goes. But the question is
whether that act was done in the performance of duty or in purported
performance of duty.
If it was done in
performance of duty or purported performance of duty, Section 197(1) of the
Code cannot be bypassed by reasoning that killing a man could never be done in
an official capacity and consequently Section 197(1) of the Code could not be
attracted.
Such a reasoning would
be against the ratio of the decisions of this Court referred to earlier. The
other reason given by the High Court that if the High Court were to interfere
on the ground of want of sanction, people will lose faith in the judicial
process, cannot also be a ground to dispense with a statutory requirement or
protection. Public trust in the institution can be maintained by entertaining
causes coming within its jurisdiction, by performing the duties entrusted to it
diligently, in accordance with law and the established procedure and without
delay.
Dispensing with of
jurisdictional or statutory requirements which may ultimately affect the
adjudication itself, will itself result in people losing faith in the system.
So, the reason in that behalf given by the High Court cannot be sufficient to
enable it to get over the jurisdictional requirement of a sanction under
Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are therefore satisfied
that the High Court was in error in holding that sanction under Section 197(1)
was not needed in this case. We hold that such sanction was necessary and for
want of sanction the prosecution must be quashed at this stage. It is not for
us now to answer the submission of learned counsel for the complainant that
this is an eminently fit case for grant of such sanction.” (emphasis is ours)
In order to
substantiate the proposition being canvassed, the learned senior counsel, also
invited our attention to R. Balakrishna Pillai vs. State of Kerala, (1996) 1
SCC 478, wherein this Court has held as under:
“6. The next question
is whether the offence alleged against the appellant can be said to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty. It was contended by the learned counsel for the State that the
charge of conspiracy would not attract Section 197 of the Code for the simple
reason that it is no part of the duty of a Minister while discharging his
official duties to enter into a criminal conspiracy.
In support of his
contention, he placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court in Harihar
Prasad vs. State of Bihar, (1972) 3 SCC 89. He drew our attention to the
observations in paragraph 74 of the judgment where the Court, while considering
the question whether the acts complained of were directly concerned with the
official duties of the public servants concerned, observed that it was no duty
of a public servant to enter into a criminal conspiracy and hence want of
sanction under Section 197 of the Code was no bar to the prosecution.
The question whether
the acts complained of had a direct nexus or relation with the discharge of
official duties by the public servant concerned would depend on the facts of
each case. There can be no general proposition that whenever there is a charge
of criminal conspiracy levelled against a public servant in or out of office
the bar of Section 197(1) of the Code would have no application.
Such a view would
render Section 197(1) of the Code specious.
Therefore, the question
would have to be examined in the facts of each case. The observations were made
by the Court in the special facts of that case which clearly indicated that the
criminal conspiracy entered into by the three delinquent public servants had no
relation whatsoever with their official duties and, therefore, the bar of
Section 197(1) was not attracted.
It must also be
remembered that the said decision was rendered keeping in view Section 197(1),
as it then stood, but we do not base our decision on that distinction. Our
attention was next invited to a three- Judge decision in B. Saha vs. M.S.
Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177.
The relevant
observations relied upon are to be found in paragraph 17 of the judgment. It is
pointed out that the words “any offence alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”
employed Section 197(1) of the code, are capable of both a narrow and a wide
interpretation but their Lordships pointed out that if they were construed too
narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, "it is no part
of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be".
At the same time, if
they were too widely construed, they will take under their umbrella every act
constituting an offence committed in the course of the same transaction in
which the official duty is performed or is purported to be performed. The right
approach, it was pointed out, was to see that the meaning of this expression
lies between these two extremes.
While on the one hand,
it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the
performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection. Only an
act constituting an offence directly or reasonably connected with his official
duty will require sanction for prosecution.
To put it briefly, it
is the quality of the act that is important, and if it falls within the scope
of the aforequoted words, the protection of Section 197 will have to be
extended to the public servant concerned. This decision, therefore, points out
what approach the Court should adopt while construing Section 197(1) of the
Code and its application to the facts of the case on hand.
7. In the present case,
the appellant is charged with having entered into a criminal conspiracy with
the co-accused while functioning as a Minister. The criminal conspiracy alleged
is that he sold electricity to an industry in the State of Karnataka “without
the consent of the Government of Kerala which is an illegal act” under the
provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Kerala Electricity
Board Rules framed thereunder.
The allegation is that
he in pursuance of the said alleged conspiracy abused his official position and
illegally sold certain units to the private industry in Bangalore (Karnataka)
which profited the private industry to the tune of Rs.19,58,630.40 or more and
it is, therefore, obvious that the criminal conspiracy alleged against the
appellant is that while functioning as the Minister for Electricity he without
the consent of the Government of Kerala supplied certain units of electricity
to a private industry in Karnataka.
Obviously, he did this
in the discharge of his duties as a Minister.
The allegation is that
it was an illegal act inasmuch as the consent of the Government of Kerala was
not obtained before this arrangement was entered into and the supply was
effected.
For that reason, it is
said that he had committed an illegality and hence he was liable to be punished
for criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B, I.P.C. It is, therefore, clear
from the charge that the act alleged is directly and reasonably connected with
his official duty as a Minister and would, therefore, attract the protection of
Section 197(1) of the Act.” (emphasis is ours)
Reliance was finally
placed on P.K. Pradhan vs. State of Sikkim, (2001) 6 SCC 704, and our attention
was drawn, to the following observations recorded therein:
“5. The legislative
mandate engrafted in sub section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from
taking cognizance of an offence except with the previous sanction of the
Government concerned in a case where the acts complained of are alleged to have
been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or
purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant
is not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Government,
touches the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by
the Statute from taking cognizance.
Different tests have
been laid down in decided cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the
relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code, "any offence alleged
to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty."
The offence alleged to
have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner,
with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under
Section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point for
determination is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty.
There must be a reasonable
connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if
the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as
this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the
merits.
What a court has to
find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one
can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of
official duty, though, possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of
situation.
XXX XXX XXX
15. Thus, from a
conspectus of the aforesaid decisions, it will be clear that for claiming
protection under Section 197 of the Code, it has to be shown by the accused
that there is reasonable connection between the act complained of and the discharge
of official duty. An official act can be performed in the discharge of official
duty as well as in dereliction of it.
For invoking protection
under Section 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused complained of must be
such that the same cannot be separated from the discharge of official duty, but
if there was no reasonable connection between them and the performance of those
duties, the official status furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the
acts, then no sanction would be required.
If the case as put
forward by the prosecution fails or the defence establishes that the act
purported to be done is in discharge of duty, the proceedings will have to be
dropped. It is well settled that question of sanction under Section 197 of the
Code can be raised any time after the cognizance; maybe immediately after
cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and
after conviction as well.
But there may be
certain cases where it may not be possible to decide the question effectively
without giving opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did was in
discharge of official duty. In order to come to the conclusion whether claim of
the accused, that the act that he did was in course of the performance of his
duty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be examined
during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the defence to establish
it. In such an eventuality, the question of sanction should be left open to be
decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of the
trial.” (emphasis is ours)
All in all, based on
the judgments referred to above, it was contended, that even if it was assumed
that Neeraj Kumar had been detained with effect from 24.06.1999, his detention
by the appellants was “while acting or purporting to act” in the discharge of
the appellants’ official duties. And as such, the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Kapurthala, could not have taken cognizance, without sanction under Section 197
of the ‘Code’.
11. Mr. Varinder S.
Rana, learned counsel, who entered appearance on behalf of respondent no. 2,
seriously contested the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants.
Learned counsel representing respondent no. 2, placed reliance on the following
observations recorded by the High Court, in the impugned order:
“As far as question of
sanction for prosecution of petitioners is concerned, the contentions raised by
learned counsel for the petitioners could possibly be applicable for the
detention period since 28.06.1999 when Neeraj Kumar was shown to have been
arrested in FIR No.30 dated 03.03.1999. However, the petitioners are not
entitled to protection of Section 197 of the Code for illegal detention and
torture of Neeraj Kumar since 24.06.1999 till 28.06.1999 when his arrest was
shown in FIR No.30 dated 03.03.1999. The said period of illegal detention and
torture has no nexus much less reasonable nexus with the discharge or purported
discharge of the official duty of the petitioners. Consequently, the impugned
order cannot be said to be illegal because sanction for prosecution of the
petitioners is not required for illegal detention and torture of Neeraj Kumar
during the aforesaid period.” (emphasis is ours)
In order to support the
conclusions drawn by the High Court, learned counsel for respondent no. 2, also
drew our attention to, Om Prakash vs. State of Jharkhand, (2012) 12 SCC 72,
wherein this Court held as under :
“32. The true test as
to whether a public servant was acting or purporting to act in discharge of his
duties would be whether the act complained of was directly connected with his
official duties or it was done in the discharge of his official duties or it
was so integrally connected with or attached to his office as to be inseparable
from it (K. Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 266).
The protection given
under Section 197 of the Code has certain limits and is available only when the
alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the
discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the
objectionable act.
If in doing his
official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable
connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess
will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection
(State of Orissa vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC 40).
If the above tests are
applied to the facts of the present case, the police must get protection given
under Section 197 of the Code because the acts complained of are so integrally
connected with or attached to their office as to be inseparable from it.
It is not possible for
us to come to a conclusion that the protection granted under Section 197 of the
Code is used by the police personnel in this case as a cloak for killing the
deceased in cold blood.” (emphasis is ours)
Reliance was then
placed on Usharani vs. The Commissioner of Police, (2015) 2 KarLJ 511 (a
judgment rendered by the Karnataka High Court), to highlight the importance and
significance of personal liberty, specially with reference to unlawful
detention wherein it has been observed as under:
“10. In Constitutional
and Administrative Law by Hood Phillips and Jackson, it is stated thus:
“The legality of any
form of detention may be challenged at common law by an application for the
writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus was a prerogative writ, that is, one
issued by the King against his officers to compel them to exercise their
functions properly. The practical importance of habeas corpus as providing a
speedy judicial remedy for the determination of an applicant’s claim for
freedom has been asserted frequently by judies and writers.
Nonetheless, the
effectiveness of the remedy depends in many instances on the width of the
statutory power under which a public authority may be acting and the
willingness of the Courts to examine the legality of decision made in reliance
on wideranging statutory provision. It has been suggested that the need for the
“blunt remedy’ of habeas corpus has diminished as judicial review has developed
into an ever more flexible jurisdiction. Procedural reform of the writ may be
appropriate, but it is important not to lose sight of substantive differences
between habeas corpus and remedies under judicial review. The latter are
discretionary and the court may refuse relief on practical grounds; habeas
corpus is a writ of right, granted ex debito justitiae.”
11. The ancient
prerogative writ of habeas corpus takes its name from the two mandatory words
“habeas” and “corpus”. ‘Habeas Corpus’ literally means ‘have his body’.
The general purpose of
these writs as their name indicates was to obtain the production of the
individual before a Court or a Judge. This is a prerogative process for
securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective relief of
immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in prison
or in private custody.
This is a writ of such
a sovereign and transcendent authority that no privilege of power or place can
stand against it. It is a very powerful safeguard of the subject against
arbitrary acts not only of private individuals but also of the Executive, the
greatest safeguard for personal liberty, according to all constitutional
jurists.
The writ is a
prerogative one obtainable by its own procedure. In England, the jurisdiction
to grant a writ existed in Common Law, but has been recognized and extended by
statute. It is well established in England that the writ of habeas corpus is as
of right and that the Court has no discretion to refuse it. “Unlike certiorari
or mandamus, a writ of habeas corpus is as of right “to every man who is
unlawfully detained. In India, it is this prerogative writ which has been given
a constitutional status under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.
Therefore, it is an
extraordinary remedy available to a citizen of this Country, which he can
enforce under Article 226 or under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.”
(emphasis is ours)
12. The first task,
which a Court is obliged to embark upon, when confronted with a proposition of
the nature in hand, is to ascertain as to whether the alleged offence,
attributed to the accused, had been committed by an accused “while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”. In the facts and circumstances
of the present case, the alleged action constituting the allegations levelled
against the appellants, is based on the arrest and detention of Neeraj Kumar
from 24.06.1999 upto 28.06.1999 (before, he was admitted to have been formally
arrested on 28.06.1999).
13. Insofar as the
power of arrest and detention by police officials/officers is concerned,
reference may be made to Section 36 of the ‘Code’ which postulates, that all
police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station,
are vested with an authority to exercise the same powers (throughout the local
area, to which they are appointed), which can be exercised by the officer in
charge of a police station. Section 49 of the ‘Code’ postulates, the manner in
which a police officer is to act, while taking an individual in custody.
Section 49 of the ‘Code’, cautions the person making the arrest to ensure, that
the individual taken into custody, is not subjected to more restraint than is
necessary, to prevent his escape. Section 50 of the ‘Code’ mandates, that every
police officer arresting a person without a warrant (as is the position,
alleged in the present case), is mandated to forthwith disclose to the person
taken in custody, full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested, as
also, the grounds for such arrest. Section 50A obliges the police officer
making the arrest, to immediately inform friends/relatives of the arrested
person (on obtaining particulars from the arrested person), regarding his
detention. And an entry of the arrest, and the communication of the information
of the arrest to the person nominated by the detenu, has to be recorded in a
register maintained at the police station, for the said purpose. Section 50A of
the ‘Code’ also mandates, that the Magistrate before whom such an arrested
person is produced, would satisfy himself that the obligations to be discharged
by the arresting officer, had been complied with.
14. Based on the
aforesaid provisions of the ‘Code’, there cannot be any serious doubt about the
fact, that Surinderjit Singh Mand and P.S. Parmar, were holding the rank of
Deputy Superintendent of Police, at the relevant time (from 24.06.199 to
28.06.1999). Both the appellants were “...officers superior in rank to an
officer in charge of a police station...”. Both the appellants were therefore
possessed with the authority to detain and arrest, Neeraj Kumar at the relevant
time (from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999). The question for complying with the
requirements in Sections 49, 50 and 50A does not arise for the period under
reference (from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999), because Neeraj Kumar according to
official police records, was arrested only on 28.06.1999. The position adopted
by the appellants was, that Neeraj Kumar was not under detention for the period
from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999.
15. Keeping the legal
position emerging from the provisions of the ‘Code’ referred to in the
foregoing paragraphs in mind, it was the contention of learned counsel for the
respondents, that in order to require sanction under Section 197 of the ‘Code’,
it needs to be further established, that the appellants had acted in the manner
provided for under the provisions of the ‘Code’, during the period Neeraj Kumar
was allegedly arrested (from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999), i.e., before his
admitted formal arrest on 28.06.1999. And only if they had done so, the
requirement of seeking sanction under Section 197 would arise, because in that
situation, the offence allegedly committed would be taken to have been
committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official
duties”. In the present case, the arrest and detention of Neeraj Kumar from
24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999, is denied.
The formalities
postulated under the ‘Code’, on the alleged arrest of Neeraj Kumar on
24.06.1999, were admittedly not complied with, as according to the appellants,
Neeraj Kumar was not arrested on that date.
It was therefore
submitted, that any arrest or detention prior to 28.06.1999, if true, was
obviously without following the mandatory conditions of arrest and detention,
contemplated under the provisions (referred to above). And therefore, would not
fall within the realm of “acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their
official duties”.
16. In order to support
the submissions recorded in the foregoing paragraphs, learned counsel for the
respondents placed reliance on P.P. Unnikrishnan vs. Puttiyottil Alikutty,
(2000) 8 SCC 131, and invited our attention to the following observations
recorded therein:
“21. If a police
officer dealing with law and order duty uses force against unruly persons,
either in his own defence or in defence of others and exceeds such right it may
amount to an offence. But such offence might fall within the amplitude of
Section 197 of the Code as well as Section 64(3) of the KP Act. But if a police
officer assaults a prisoner inside a lock-up he cannot claim such act to be
connected with the discharge of his authority or exercise of his duty unless he
establishes that he did such acts in his defence or in defence of others or any
property. Similarly, if a police officer wrongfully confines a person in the
lock-up beyond a period of 24 hours without the sanction of a Magistrate or an
order of a court it would be an offence for which he cannot claim any
protection in the normal course, nor can he claim that such act was done in
exercise of his official duty. A policeman keeping a person in the lock-up for
more than 24 hours without authority is not merely abusing his duty but his act
would be quite outside the contours of his duty or authority.” (emphasis is
ours)
Based on the provisions
of the ‘Code’, pertaining to arrest and detention of individuals at the hands
of police personnel (referred to above), it was submitted, that the arrest of
Neeraj Kumar from 28.06.1999 to 30.06.1999 would unquestionably fall within the
purview of “acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duties” (of the concerned police officers/officials who arrested Neeraj Kumar).
It was however asserted, that if the arrest of Neeraj Kumar from 24.06.1999 to
28.06.1999 (before he was formally detained on 28.06.1999) is found to be
factually correct, such arrest of Neeraj Kumar cannot be accepted to have been
made by the appellants – Surinderjit Singh Mand and P.S.Parmar, while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties. It was therefore
submitted, that any alleged criminality, in connection with the detention of Neeraj
Kumar from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999, would not require to be sanctioned under
Section 197, before the concerned Court, took cognizance of the matter, against
the concerned public servants.
17. Having given our
thoughtful consideration to the contention advanced at the hands of learned
counsel for the respondents, we are of the view, that the decision rendered by
this Court in the P.P. Unnikrishnan case (supra) is clear and emphatic. The
same does not leave any room for making any choice. It is apparent, that the
official arrest of Neeraj Kumar in terms of the provisions of the ‘Code’,
referred to hereinabove, would extend during the period from 28.06.1999 to
30.06.1999. The above period of apprehension can legitimately be considered as,
having been made “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their
official duties”. The factual position expressed by the appellants is, that
Neeraj Kumar was not detained for the period from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999. His
detention during the above period, if true, in our considered view, would
certainly not emerge from the action of the accused while acting or purporting
to act in the discharge of their official duties. If it emerges from evidence
adduced before the trial Court, that Neeraj Kumar was actually detained during
the period from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999, the said detention cannot be taken to
have been made by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of their official duties. More so, because it is not the case of the
appellants, that they had kept Neeraj Kumar in jail during the period from
24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999. If they had not detained him during the above period,
it is not open to anyone to assume the position, that the detention of Neeraj
Kumar, during the above period, was while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of their official duties. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case, based on the legal position declared by this Court
in the P.P. Unnikrishnan case (supra), we are of the considered view, that
sanction for prosecution of the accused in relation to the detention of Neeraj
Kumar for the period from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999, would not be required,
before a Court of competent jurisdiction, takes cognizance with reference to
the alleged arrest of Neeraj Kumar. We therefore hereby, endorse the
conclusions drawn by the High Court, to the above effect.
18. It was also the
contention of learned counsel for the appellants, that the protection afforded
to public servants under Section 197 of the ‘Code’, postulating sanction prior
to prosecution, on account of the acts committed while discharging their
official duties, is to shield public servants from frivolous harassment of
prosecution, at the hands of private individuals. It was therefore, the
submission of learned counsel for the respondents, that the scope and purview
of Section 197 of the ‘Code’, should be limited to the initiation of criminal
proceedings under Chapter- XIV of the ‘Code’, wherein such initiation is
postulated under Section 190 (upon receipt of a complaint, wherein facts
disclose the commission of an offence, or upon a police report of such facts,
or upon information received from any person other than a police officer, that
such offence had been committed). In all the above situations, it is open to a
Magistrate to take cognizance of such offence subject to the condition that the
same falls within the jurisdictional competence of the said Magistrate. The
Magistrate would however proceed against a public servant, after sanction has
been granted by the concerned Government. And in case, the same does not fall
within the competence of a Magistrate, to commit it to a Court of Session,
which can take cognizance of the same, as provided for by Section 193 of the
‘Code’. Whereupon, the Court to which the matter is committed may proceed
against a public servant, after sanction has been granted by the concerned
Government under Section 197 of the ‘Code’. In emphasizing on the above scope
of sanction, it was pointed out, that Section 197 of the ‘Code’ being a part of
Chapter-XIV of the ‘Code’, its applicability would extend to the provisions
under Chapter-XIV alone. It was submitted, that Section 319 of the ‘Code’ is
contained in Chapter XXIV, over which Section 197 can have no bearing.
19. In continuation of
the submissions noticed in the foregoing paragraphs, it was asserted by learned
counsel representing the respondents, that the prosecution contemplated under
Section 197 of the ‘Code’, and the action of the Court in taking cognizance,
pertain to actions initiated on the basis of complaints, which disclose the
commission of an offence, or on a police report of such facts, or upon receipt
of information from a person other than the police officer, that such offence
had been committed. It was asserted, that the above action of taking cognizance
by a Court, is based on alleged “facts” and not “on evidence” recorded by a
Court. The above distinction was drawn by referring to Section 190 of the
‘Code’ which contemplates initiation of action on the basis of facts alleged
against an accused, as against, Section 319 of the ‘Code’ whereunder action is
triggered against the concerned person only if it appears from the evidence
recorded during the trial, that the said person was involved in the commission
of an offence. While making a reference to Section 319 of the ‘Code’, it was
submitted on behalf of the respondents, that cognizance taken under Section 319
of the ‘Code’, was by the Court itself, and therefore, the same having been
based on “evidence”, as also, the satisfaction of the Court itself, that such
person needed to be tried together with the “other accused”, it seemed
unreasonable, that sanction postulated under Section 197 of the ‘Code’ should
still be required. It was pointed out, that the protection contemplated under
Section 197 of the ‘Code’, was not a prerequisite necessity, when cognizance
was based on the evaluation of “evidence” by a Court itself. Learned counsel
emphasized, that when a Court itself had determined, that cognizance was
required to be taken, based on evidence which had been recorded by the same
Court, it would be undermining the authority of the concerned Court, if its
judicial determination, was considered subservient to the decision taken by the
authorities contemplated under Section 197 of the ‘Code’. Based on the
submissions noticed above, it was the vehement contention of learned counsel
for the respondents that the mandate of Section 197 would not extend to cases
where cognizance had been taken under Section 319 of the ‘Code’.
20. While dealing with
the first contention, we have already recorded our conclusions, which are
sufficient to dispose of the matter under consideration. But, an important
legal proposition has been canvassed, as the second submission, on behalf of
the respondents (which we have recorded in the foregoing paragraph). Since it
squarely arises in the facts and circumstances of this case, we consider it our
bounden duty, to render our determination thereon, as well. In the succeeding
paragraphs, we will deal with the second contention.
21. Insofar as the
second contention advanced at the hands of learned counsel for the respondents
is concerned, we are of the view that there is sufficient existing precedent,
to draw a conclusion in respect of the proposition canvassed. Reference in the
first instance may be made to Dilawar Singh vs. Parvinder Singh alias Iqbal
Singh, (2005) 12 SCC 709. The following observations in the above cited
judgment are of relevance to the present issue:
“2. It is necessary to
mention the basic facts giving rise to the present appeals. On the complaint
made by the wife, a case was registered against Parvinder Singh @ Iqbal Singh
under Section 406/498-A IPC. On 27.1.2000 Parvinder Singh @ Iqbal Singh gave a
complaint to the SSP, Barnala alleging that on 23.1.2000, Jasbir Singh, ASI and
a Home Guard came to his house on a scooter and forcibly took him to the Police
Station Barnala. He was beaten and tortured and was subjected to third-degree
methods. Some of his relatives, namely, Jarnail Singh, Sukhdev Singh, Sadhu
Singh Grewal and Sukhdev Singh Virk came to the police station and requested
the police personnel not to beat or torture him. It was further alleged in the
complaint that Jasbir Singh, ASI, told them that they should talk to Dilawar
Singh, S.H.O., who was sitting there on a chair. Dilawar Singh then demanded an
amount of Rs.20,000/- for releasing Parvinder Singh. His relations then brought
the amount, out of which Rs.15,000/- was offered to Dilawar Singh but he said
that the money may be handed over to ASI Jasbir Singh. The amount of
Rs.15,000/- was then given to ASI Jasbir Singh, who kept the same in the pocket
of his coat. Parvinder Singh was medically examined on 28.1.2000 and a case was
registered under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). After investigation,
charge-sheet was submitted only against ASI Jasbir Singh. A closure report was
submitted against Dilawar Singh, S.H.O. as in the opinion of the investigating
officer he had not committed any offence. It may be mentioned here that for
prosecution of ASI Jasbir Singh, necessary sanction had been obtained from the
competent authority under Section 19 of the Act. After the statement of the
complainant Parvinder Singh had been recorded, he moved an application under
Section 319 Cr.P.C. for summoning Dilawar Singh, S.H.O. as a co-accused in the
case. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the learned Special Judge
dismissed the application by the order dated 7.1.2002. Parvinder Singh filed a
revision petition against the aforesaid order which has been allowed by the
High Court by the impugned order dated 3.7.2002 and a direction has been issued
to summon Dilawar Singh and try him in accordance with law.
XXX XXX XXX
4. In our opinion, the
contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded.
Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act, which is relevant for the controversy
in dispute, reads as under:
"19. Previous
sanction necessary for prosecution.-(1) No court shall take cognizance of an
offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been
committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, -
(a) in the case of a
person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not
removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central
Government, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a
person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not
removable from his office save by or with sanction of the State Government, of
that Government;
(c) in the case of any
other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office."
This section creates a
complete bar on the power of the Court to take cognizance of an offence
punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed
by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the competent
authority enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of this sub-section. If the sub-section
is read as a whole, it will clearly show that the sanction for prosecution has
to be granted with respect to a specific accused and only after sanction has
been granted that the Court gets the competence to take cognizance of an
offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been
committed by such public servant. It is not possible to read the section in the
manner suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent that if sanction for
prosecution has been granted qua one accused, any other public servant for
whose prosecution no sanction has been granted, can also be summoned to face
prosecution.
5. In State v. Raj
Kumar Jain, (1998) 6 SCC 551, the Court was examining the scope of Section 6(1)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is almost similar to
sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. After quoting the provisions of
Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, it was held as under in
para 5 of the Report: (SCC pp. 552-53) "5. From a plain reading of the
above section it is evidently clear that a Court cannot take cognizance of the
offences mentioned therein without sanction of the appropriate authority. In
enacting the above section, the legislature thought of providing a reasonable
protection to public servants in the discharge of their official functions so
that they may perform their duties and obligations undeterred by vexatious and
unnecessary prosecutions."
6. In Jaswant Singh v.
State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 124, sanction had been granted for prosecution of
the accused for an offence under Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, but no sanction had been granted for his prosecution
under Section 5(1)(a) of the said Act. It was held that no cognizance could be
taken for prosecution of the accused under Section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, as no sanction had been granted with regard to the said
offence, but the accused could be tried under Section 5(1)(d) of the said Act
as there was a valid sanction for prosecution under the aforesaid provision.
7. In State of Goa v.
Babu Thomas, (2005) 8 SCC 130, decided by this Bench on 29.9.2005, it was held
that in the absence of a valid sanction on the date when the Special Judge took
cognizance of the offence, the taking of the cognizance was without
jurisdiction and wholly invalid. This being the settled position of law, the
impugned order of the High Court directing summoning of the appellant and
proceeding against him along with Jasbir Singh, ASI is clearly erroneous in
law. (emphasis is ours)
The above issue was
also examined by this Court in Paul Varghese vs. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC
783, wherein this Court observed as under:
“2. Challenge in this
appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High
Court allowing the revision filed by the Respondent 2 in the present appeal who
was the petitioner before the High Court. He had questioned correctness of the
order passed by the Inquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Trichoor, by which the
prayer for his impleadment as the accused in terms of Section 319 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) was accepted. By the said
order the Trial Court had held that Section 319 of the Code overrides the
provisions of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short
“the Act”) and for exercise of power under the former provision, the only
conditions required to be fulfilled are set out in sub-section (4) of Section
319 itself. The High Court felt that the view was not sustainable in view of
what has been stated by this Court in Dilawar Singh v. Parvinder Singh alias
Iqbal Singh and Anr. (2005 (12) SCC 709). Accordingly, the order was set aside.
XXX XXX XXX
4. As has been rightly
held by the High Court in view of what has been stated in Dilawar Singh's case
(supra), the Trial Court was not justified in holding that Section 319 of the
Code has to get preference/primacy over Section 19 of the Act, and that matter
stands concluded.....” (emphasis is ours)
Last of all, reference
may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Subramanian Swamy vs.
Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64. For the issue under reference, the following
observations recorded in the above judgment are relevant:
“74. Keeping those
principles in mind, as we must, if we look at Section 19 of the P.C. Act which
bars a Court from taking cognizance of cases of corruption against a public
servant under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act, unless the Central or
the State Government, as the case may be, has accorded sanction, virtually
imposes fetters on private citizens and also on prosecutors from approaching
Court against corrupt public servants. These protections are not available to
other citizens. Public servants are treated as a special class of persons
enjoying the said protection so that they can perform their duties without fear
and favour and without threats of malicious prosecution. However, the said
protection against malicious prosecution which was extended in public interest
cannot become a shield to protect corrupt officials. These provisions being
exceptions to the equality provision of Article 14 are analogous to the
provisions of protective discrimination and these protections must be construed
very narrowly. These procedural provisions relating to sanction must be
construed in such a manner as to advance the causes of honesty and justice and
good governance as opposed to escalation of corruption.
75. Therefore, in every
case where an application is made to an appropriate authority for grant of
prosecution in connection with an offence under the P.C. Act it is the bounden
duty of such authority to apply its mind urgently to the situation and decide
the issue without being influenced by any extraneous consideration. In doing
so, the authority must make a conscious effort to ensure the Rule of Law and
cause of justice is advanced. In considering the question of granting or
refusing such sanction, the authority is answerable to law and law alone.
Therefore, the requirement to take the decision with a reasonable dispatch is
of the essence in such a situation. Delay in granting sanction proposal thwarts
a very valid social purpose, namely, the purpose of a speedy trial with the
requirement to bring the culprit to book. Therefore, in this case the right of
the sanctioning authority, while either sanctioning or refusing to grant
sanction, is coupled with a duty.” (Emphasis is ours)
22. The law declared by
this Court emerging from the judgments referred to hereinabove, leaves no room
for any doubt, that under Section 197 of the ‘Code’ and/or sanction mandated
under a special statute (as postulated under Section 19 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act) would be a necessary pre-requisite, before a Court of competent
jurisdiction, takes cognizance of an offence (whether under the Indian Penal
Code, or under the concerned special statutory enactment). The procedure for
obtaining sanction would be governed by the provisions of the ‘Code’ and/or as
mandated under the special enactment. The words engaged in Section 197 of the
‘Code’ are, “...no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with
previous sanction...” Likewise sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act provides, “No Court shall take cognizance, except with the
previous sanction...” The mandate is clear and unambiguous, that a Court “shall
not” take cognizance without sanction. The same needs no further elaboration.
Therefore, a Court just cannot take cognizance, without sanction by the
appropriate authority. Thus viewed, we find no merit in the second contention
advanced at the hands of learned counsel for the respondents, that where
cognizance is taken under Section 319 of the ‘Code’, sanction either under
Section 197 of the ‘Code’ (or under the concerned special enactment) is not a
mandatory pre-requisite.
23. According to
learned counsel representing respondent no. 2, the position concluded above,
would give the impression, that the determination rendered by a Court under
Section 319 of the ‘Code’, is subservient to the decision of the competent
authority under Section 197. No, not at all. The grant of sanction under
Section 197, can be assailed by the accused by taking recourse to judicial
review. Likewise, the order declining sanction, can similarly be assailed by the
complainant or the prosecution.
24. For the reasons
recorded hereinabove, and in view of the conclusions recorded by us in
paragraph 17, we are of the view that there is no merit in the instant appeal
and the same deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
..........................J.
(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
..........................J.
(C.NAGAPPAN)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 05, 2016.
_____________________________________________________________
ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.3 SECTION IIB
S U P R E M E C O U R T
O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal
No(s).565/2016 @ SLP(Crl.) No.3406/2008 SURINDERJIT SINGH MAND & ANR.
Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. Respondent(s) [HEARD BY HON'BLE
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND HON'BLE C.NAGAPPAN, JJ.] Date : 05/07/2016 This appeal
was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr.
Yash Pal Dhingra,Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Kuldip Singh,Adv.
Mr. Rajat Sharma, Adv.
for Mr. Subhasish
Bhowmick,AOR
Hon'ble Mr. Justice
Jagdish Singh Khehar pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His
Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.
For the reasons
recorded in the Reportable judgment, which is placed on the file, the appeal is
dismissed.
(Renuka Sadana) (Parveen Kumar)
Court Master AR-cum-PS
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