Satish Shetty Vs State
of Karnataka
Once the prosecution
succeeds in establishing the component of cruelty leading to conviction under
Section 498A, in our view only in a rare case, the Court can refuse to invoke
the presumption of abetment, if other requirements of Section 113A of the
Evidence Act stand satisfied, the Court said. The Supreme Court in Satish
Shetty vs. State of Karnataka has observed that, factum of delay in lodging FIR
in Section 498-A cases has to be dealt with sympathetically keeping in mind the
mental condition of the close relations of the victim. Division Bench
comprising of Justices Dipak Misra and Shiva Kirti Singh dismissed the appeal
against conviction under Section 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, filed
by a Husband observing that he failed to rebut the presumptions raised against
him under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. The bench added that, once the
prosecution succeeds in establishing the component of cruelty leading to
conviction under Section 498A, in our view only in a rare case, the Court can
refuse to invoke the presumption of abetment, if other requirements of Section
113A of the Evidence Act stand satisfied.
FAILED TO REBUT
PRESUMPTIONS
Upholding the judgment
of the High Court, the Bench said “The High Court found the later explanations
unacceptable and the initial explanation that the deceased committed suicide
because she was not permitted to go to her mother’s place does not inspire
confidence and has rightly been rejected by the High Court. Only for such a
trivial matter, a hale and hearty young woman having a ten months old son and a
pregnancy of twenty weeks is not at all expected to take her life. The appellant
not only gave absolutely no explanation for the injuries on the person of the
deceased, rather he chose to conceal them by keeping mum. Clearly the appellant
failed to rebut the presumptions raised against him under Section 113A of the
Evidence Act. Having gone through the relevant facts and the reasoning of the
trial court we are not persuaded to take a different view.”
DELAY IN LODGING FIR TO
BE DEALT SYMPATHETICALLY
Criticising the Trial
Court finding acquitting the accused taking into account delay in filing of
FIR, the Court said “When the deceased died leaving a son of ten months old the
mother of the deceased had many other things to worry for, including cremation
of the dead body and in such circumstances the High Court was justified in
criticizing the trial court for its hyper technical approach in blaming the
mother of the deceased for lodging a delayed complaint. It will be useful to
remember that delay in lodging the FIR or complaint is not fatal in all cases.
The Court must show some sensitivity in cases of present nature where the
victim’s closest relation – mother is a poor helpless lady. Even a well to do
person may suffer a state of mental confusion when struck by such a tragedy.
The prosecution in such cases is likely to be delayed further if the deceased
has left behind children. The issues relating to their safety and custody often
require higher priority. Occurrences of the present nature require lodging of
criminal case against persons who are already in the category of relation by virtue
of matrimonial ties through the deceased and it is not always easy to take a
decision whether to lodge a criminal case against a relation or not. Hence in
such cases the factum of delay has to be dealt with sympathetically keeping in
mind the mental condition of the close relations of the victim. The trial court
miserably failed on this count too.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1358
of 2008
Satish Shetty
…..Appellant
Versus
State of Karnataka
…..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.
1. This appeal by
special leave is directed against judgment and order dated 13.09.2007 passed by
a Division Bench of High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.
1409 of 2000 preferred by the State against judgment dated 16.09.2000 by First Additional
Sessions Judge, D.K. Mangalore in SC No. 150/94 whereby the appellant and both
his parents were acquitted for offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC).
1
By the impugned order
High Court has reversed the judgment of acquittal in part. It has convicted the
appellant, the husband of the victim lady, for the offence under Section 498-A
with punishment of rigorous imprisonment (RI) of three years and a fine of Rs.5000/-
with a default clause. The appellant has also been convicted for the offence under
Section 306 of the IPC with RI for five years and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, again
with a default clause. Both the sentences are to run concurrently. If realized,
the fine amount is to be paid to PW-6 Gulabi, mother of the deceased, if she is
alive.
2. Learned senior
counsel Mr. P. Vishwanatha Shetty appearing for the appellant has raised three
main contentions to assail the judgment and order under appeal. According to
him, the judgment and order of acquittal was not a perverse judgment and
required no interference by the High Court. Secondly, it is contended that in absence
of any charge framed under Section 306 of IPC by the trial court the High Court
should not have convicted the appellant under that Section. Lastly but not the
least, is the contention that there is no evidence on record to justify the
conviction of the appellant by the High Court for any of the charges.
3. Mr. V. N. Raghupathy
learned counsel for the respondent has, on the other hand, strenuously refuted
all the aforesaid three submissions and has placed reliance on the relevant
materials on
2
record as well as the
discussions made by the High Court in the impugned order to fully support that
judgment and order reversing the acquittal of the appellant to the extent
indicated above.
4. Before adverting to
specific contentions for deciding the main issue whether the impugned judgment
and order requires interference, it will be useful and relevant to take note of
the factual matrix of this case. The story of the deceased young lady, aged
about 25 years who was forced to commit suicide by the unfortunate situation
and circumstances surrounding her life, resembles the tale of so many similar
young ladies who end their life due to untold miseries and hardships faced by
them within the confines of the four walls of their matrimonial home. All of
them enter such home with hope of leading a long and blissful married life but
this hope, invariably, does not last long, nor their life. In the present case
the victim left behind a son then aged about ten months and she was also mothering
a life of twenty weeks in her womb. The deceased Rekha @ Baby was married with
the appellant on 5.06.1991 and immediately she began her stay in matrimonial
home with her husband and in-laws and a son was also born to them who on the
date of her death i.e. 19.11.1993 was aged about ten months. There is no
dispute regarding her death and even as per the Unnatural Death Report (UDR)
exhibit Ex.P.20, lodged by the appellant with the local police
3
station on 19.11.1993
at 9.45 a.m, she died of some poison which she had consumed allegedly because
the appellant forbade her from going to her mother’s place in the morning hours
of 18.11.1993. As described in the said report, the victim had consumed a
poison which was kept for spray in the fields. She had been taken to hospital
but expired there at around 8 a.m. As per version of the occurrence given by
the appellant, the deceased and he were living a very happy life. He was
satisfied with the money and gold given at the time of marriage as dowry and
was apparently at a loss as to why the deceased consumed poison.
5. The records have
been carefully noticed by the High Court and they reveal that the police/the
investigating agency, soon after learning about the occurrence made a request
to the Tehsildar (Executive Magistrate), PW-15 to conduct inquest proceedings
under Section 174 of Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court has rightly condemned
the Tehsildar’s action in causing undue delay and holding the inquest two days
later on 22.11.1993. It was after the inquest that the mother of the deceased,
Gulabi, PW-6 lodged the complaint with the police on 22.11.1993 and on that
basis police registered a Criminal Case No. 136/93 for offences under Section
498-A, 304-B of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
After investigation police submitted chargesheet against the husband of the
4
deceased and his
parents only. Subsequently another relation was summoned as accused no. 4 under
Section 319 of CrPC.
6. Dr. M.R. Shetty,
PW-8 has proved the postmortem report. He has deposed that he conducted the
autopsy on the deceased in the afternoon of 22.11.1993 along with another
Doctor and found the following wounds on the dead body:
1. Transverse contusion
across the lower part of the rt. Thigh 2”
above the knee joint 2”
in length.
2. Haematoma 6” x 3” on
the lower part of the left thigh with abrasion of different sizes on it;
3. Abrasion on the rt.
Lumbar region 2-1/2”;
4. Abrasion on the back
of the rt. Thigh 2-1/2”;
5. Multiple small
abrasions on the rt. Hand of different sizes; and
6. Blood strained fluid
from the nostrils.
He had found a twenty
weeks embryo in the womb of the deceased. He deposed that as per subsequent
chemical lab report of the viscera, the death was because of consumption of
Organo phosphorous chemical. The Doctor has also deposed that the wounds were
ante-mortem caused by hard and blunt object but they did not cause the death.
The unnatural death of the victim within seven years of marriage is not in
dispute.
5
7. The High Court has
scrutinized the deposition of mother of the deceased PW-6 and her two younger
brothers PW-9 and PW-20 for coming to a finding that at the time of marriage
they had to arrange money to meet the demand of the husband of the deceased for
payment of dowry in cash and gold. The witnesses on this aspect were found
trust-worthy and not indulging into exaggeration or false allegations. The
trial court on the other hand went into unnecessary details to discuss this
issue on the basis of capacity of the complainant to pay, source of money
arranged by her and whether actually money had been paid at the professed place
or not. Though there is difference in the amount but nonetheless in the UDR complaint
in Ex.P20 the appellant has admitted of taking Rs.25,000/- as dowry. The High
Court has rightly held that the trial court should not have gone into further
details. The only relevant issue was initial payment of dowry and not its
quantum. But this aspect need not be pursued further because the High Court has
also, while relying on the evidence of the prosecution that one year after the
marriage during her visit to her mother the deceased had informed that the
accused were harassing her by making a demand for additional dowry of 20 sovereigns
of gold and Rs.1,00,000/- for investment by the appellant in a wine shop, has
held that such subsequent demand being
6
unrelated to marriage,
need not be accepted as demand for dowry and therefore the offence under
Section 304 of the IPC is not attracted. In this regard it was noticed that in
Section 304 of the IPC as per the explanation, “dowry” shall have the same
meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
8. The High Court has
considered the issue whether Section 498-A and 306 of the IPC are attracted or
not and after extracting the relevant provisions as well as Section 113A of the
Evidence Act, has held the appellant guilty of the offences under Section 498-A
and 306 of the IPC. For that the High Court has relied upon relevant materials consisting
of oral evidence available on record as well as documentary evidence in the
forms of letters. Before discussing whether the High Court has committed any
error of facts or law on this issue, it is useful to examine the first
contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the High Court should not
have interfered with the acquittal of appellant.
9. As already noticed,
on the issue whether the marriage was performed after demanding and accepting
dowry, the High Court found the approach of the trial court totally erroneous.
The findings were found to be vitiated on account of trial Judge ignoring the
glaring facts emerging from deposition of PW-6, 9 and 20 as well as PW 13
7
and 16 and also by
ignoring the admission of the accused in the UDR complaint at Ex.P.20.
10. The High Court has
further rightly held that the trial Judge failed to look for the relevant
documents already available on the record and wrongly drew inference against
the prosecution for not producing the statements of PW-6 and other relations of
the deceased recorded by Taluka Executive Magistrate under Section 174 CrPC
proceedings.
Presently it is not
disputed that those statements were/are available on record along with the
inquest report. It is noted that such erroneous approach of the trial court had
strong influence on its judgment rendering it perverse. In fact, had the trial
court applied its
mind to the scope of
Section 174 of the CrPc as explained by this Court in the case of Pedda
Narayana and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh1, such gross error could have
been avoided because such statements do not have much legal weight as they are
beyond the scope of inquest proceedings under Section 174 of CrPC.
11. On the basis of
relevant facts the High Court appears to be justified in holding that there is
good explanation for the delay in lodging the FIR on 22.11.1993 because PW-15
delayed the inquest proceedings without valid reasons leading to delay in the
postmortem examination as well and only on knowledge of the injuries etc. the
_______________________
1 (1975) 4 SCC 153 =
AIR 1975 SC 1252
8
mother of the deceased
gathered strength to lodge the FIR. When the deceased died leaving a son of ten
months old the mother of the deceased had many other things to worry for,
including cremation of the dead body and in such circumstances the High Court
was justified in criticizing the trial court for its hyper technical approach
in blaming the mother of the deceased for lodging a delayed complaint. It will
be useful to remember that delay in lodging the FIR or complaint is not fatal
in all cases. The Court must show some sensitivity in cases of present nature
where the victim’s closest relation - mother is a poor helpless lady. Even a
well to do person may suffer a state of mental confusion when struck by such a
tragedy. The prosecution in such cases is likely to be delayed further if the
deceased has left behind children. The issues relating to their safety and
custody often require higher priority. Occurrences of the present nature
require lodging of criminal case against persons who are already in the category
of relation by virtue of matrimonial ties through the deceased and it is not
always easy to take a decision whether to lodge a criminal case against a
relation or not. Hence in such cases the factum of delay has to be dealt with
sympathetically keeping in mind the mental condition of the close relations of
the victim. The trial court miserably failed on this count too.
9
12. The evidence of
PW-6 mother of the deceased is well supported by PW-7 Pratap, a cousin of the
deceased who had visited the deceased during Dushera holidays, a month prior to
her death. He found that the deceased was getting continuous ill-treatment by
her husband. He has deposed to the extent that the deceased requested PW-7 not
to disclose the ill-treatment to her mother because she would get upset.
The letters contained
in Ex P-7 dated 27.9.1993 and exhibit D-3 dated 28.10.1993 have been discussed
by both the Courts below. We are in agreement with the views of the High Court
that those letters written respectively by the deceased to her mother and by
sister of the deceased to the deceased, do not help the defence at all. The
trial court had clearly adopted a perverse approach in appreciating those letters
as if they are in favour of the defence. Further, the correct and logical
inferences from these documents were rejected by the trial court in paragraph
37 of the judgment by again resorting to adverse inference on the incorrect
ground that statements of PW-6 and PW-9 recorded by the Tehsildar at the time
of conducting inquest were not produced before the Court. As already noticed
earlier, these statements formed part of the inquest report and were available
on record.
13. In view of
aforesaid discussions we find no merit in the first contention that the
judgment and order of the acquittal was not
10
perverse or that it
required no interference of the High Court. The views of the High Court on this
issue are sound and we are in agreement that the judgment of the trial court
suffered from such gross errors in approach and appreciation that it could not
be saved on the principle that if two views are possible, there should be no interference
with a judgment and order of acquittal.
14. So far as the
second contention is concerned, the same needs to be noticed only for
rejection. To be fair to the learned counsel, he has not dealt on this
contention at any length nor has cited any judgment.
The High Court on the
other hand dealt with the issue of conviction under Section 306 of the IPC in
absence of a charge under that head in detail in paragraphs 44 and 45. It has
also noticed some judgments of the Karnataka High Court and this Court in
paragraph 44. The issue is definitely not res integra in view of judgment of
this Court in somewhat similar circumstances in the case of K. Prema S. Rao and
another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and others2. In that case the acquittal of the
husband of the deceased under 304-B IPC was not reversed but this Court while
upholding the conviction of the all the three accused under Section 498-A IPC,
further convicted the husband of the victim under Section 306 IPC after
discussing issues relating to absence of a charge under Section 306 IPC in a
case of
_______________________
2 (2003) 1 SCC 217
11
suicide when the
relevant and material facts are already part of charge under Section 498-A and
304-B of the IPC. That judgment rendered by a Bench of Three Judges in somewhat
identical facts, in our view leaves no scope for accepting the second
contention on behalf of the appellant.
15. The last contention
on behalf of the appellant that there is no evidence to justify the conviction
of the appellant for any of the charges, indirectly stands negated by our
discussions and findings in respect of the first contention itself. However to
consider the legality of the view taken by the High Court we propose to deal
with this issue further after taking note of the relevant provisions of law
i.e. Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC as well as Section 113A of the Evidence
Act which are extracted below:
“Section 498-A. Husband
or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—
Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall
be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the
purpose of this section, ‘cruelty’ means—
(a) any wilful conduct
which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or
to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the
woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person
related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
12
security or is on
account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”
Section 306. Abetment
of suicide.—
If any person commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
Section 113-A.
Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.—
When the question is
whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or
any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide
within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband
or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may
presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such
suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation.—For the
purposes of this section, ‘cruelty’shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A
of the Indian Penal Code.”
16. On a plain reading
of Section 498-A it transpires that if a married woman is subjected to cruelty
by the husband or his relative, the offender is liable to be punished with the
sentence indicated in the Section. But cruelty can be of different types and
therefore what kind of cruelty would constitute offence has been defined under
the explanation. As per first definition contained in clause (a) – it means a willful
conduct of such a nature which is likely to drive the victim woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injuries to health and life, limb or health (mental
or physical). The other definition of cruelty is in
13
clause (b) and is
attracted when a woman is harassed with a view to coercing her or any of her
relation to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure to meet such demand.
17. In the present case
after noticing the injuries on the person of victim which is not at all explained
by the appellant husband although in the fateful night he and the deceased
slept together in the same room before she consumed poison, the High Court has
come to a well considered finding in paragraph 42 of the impugned judgment that
the deceased was being harassed both physically and mentally and in direct as
well as indirect ways for non compliance with the demand of the accused for
Rs.1,00,000/- for investment in his wine business. The High Court found that
such harassment falls squarely under clause (b) of the explanation of Section
498-A of the IPC. We find no good reason to take a different view.
18. The High Court
after recording the aforesaid finding proceeded to consider whether Section 306
of the IPC is also attracted against the appellant or not. Since the High Court
had, on relevant material returned a finding of guilt under Section 498-A of
the IPC, it found the circumstances of the case right and proper for resorting
to Section 113A of the Evidence Act which permits raising of presumption as to abetment
to suicide by a married woman. Such a statutory
14
presumption though
discretionary, may be presumed by the Court in appropriate cases where the
question of abetment of suicide by a woman is under consideration in respect of
her husband or any of his relative and if the suicide has been committed within
seven years of marriage, provided the husband or such relative had subjected
her to cruelty.
19. Since the High
Court had recorded a finding against the appellant of causing cruelty to the
deceased for his conviction under Section 498-A, all the essential ingredients
for raising of presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act were clearly
made out. But the issue raised before us is whether the High Court was
justified in resorting to exercise such a discretion as was available to it
under Section 113A or not.
20. That the Court has
a discretion in the matter of resorting to presumption is clear from the plain
words used in that Section – “the Court may presume” (emphasis supplied). The
law on this issue is also well settled and therefore needs no elaborate
discussion but at this stage the relevant case laws cited by learned senior
counsel for the appellant need to be taken note of.
21. Reliance has been
placed on behalf of appellant on the judgment of this Court in the case of Hans
Raj v. State of Haryana3. In this
_______________________
3 (2004) 12 SCC 257
15
case it was reiterated
that Section 113A of the Evidence Act vests a discretion in the Court to raise
such a presumption having regard to all the other circumstances of the case. On
evidence and facts of that case it was found that the nature of cruelty proved
in that case was not such as is likely to drive the women to commit suicide or
to cause grievous injury etc. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Gangula
Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh4. The facts of that case were entirely
different and required interpretation of the term “abetment” as defined under
Section 107 of the IPC. In that case the victim was a servant of the accused
and the case did not require any examination of inter-dependence and
inter-connectivity of Section 498A and 306 of the IPC or of Section 113A of the
Evidence Act.
22. Reliance was also
placed upon case of M. Mohan v. State5. The Court followed the general law with
regard to ingredients of abetment in the context of Section 306 of the IPC and
quashed the prosecution of some of the relations of the husband on the peculiar
facts of the case which disclosed that there was no allegation of any dowry demand
or instigation against those appellants although they were relatives of the
husband. In the case of Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana6, this Court acquitted
the appellant who was husband of the deceased for the offences under Sections
498-A and 306 of the IPC on
_______________________
4 (2010) 1 SCC 750
5 (2011) 3 SCC 626
6 (2014) 12 SCC 595
16
the ground that the
prosecution had not succeeded in establishing the offences. The accused had merely
left the deceased wife in the matrimonial home in the company of his parents
while proceeding to report for duty as a constable to another place. This Court
held that such action would not amount to abetment to commit suicide.
23. The aforesaid case
laws do not lay down any proposition of law which may warrant interference with
the views of the High Court in the
impugned judgment. In the case of Narayanamurthy v. State of Karnataka7 the law
was reiterated that if on appreciation of evidence two views are possible then
the appellate court should not interfere with the judgment of acquittal in
favour of the accused. There is no quarrel with the said proposition. The High
Court was aware of such legal principle and keeping the same in mind, it has
discussed the evidence for coming to a conclusion that the findings of the
trial court leading to acquittal were fully unwarranted and it is not a case
where two views are possible. Hence the High Court proceeded to convict the appellant
for the offences under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC.
24. Once the
prosecution succeeds in establishing the component of cruelty leading to
conviction under Section 498A, in our view only in a rare case, the Court can
refuse to invoke the presumption of abetment, if other requirements of Section
113A of the Evidence Act
_______________________
7 (2008) 16 SCC 512
17
stand satisfied. This
proposition is amply supported by the view taken by the three-Judge Bench of
this Court in the case of K. Prema S. Rao and Anr. (Supra). Further, the High
Court has given good reasons on the basis of facts brought on record through
evidence for exercising the discretion of invoking the presumption under
Section 113A of the Evidence Act and thereafter it has discussed in detail the explanations
given by the appellant in the initial version by way of Unnatural Death Report
as well as the later explanations. The High Court found the later explanations
unacceptable and the initial explanation that the deceased committed suicide
because she was not permitted to go to her mother’s place does not inspire
confidence and has rightly been rejected by the High Court. Only for such a
trivial matter, a hale and hearty young woman having a ten months old son and a
pregnancy of twenty weeks is not at all expected to take her life.
The appellant not only
gave absolutely no explanation for the injuries on the person of the deceased, rather
he chose to conceal them by keeping mum. Clearly the appellant failed to rebut
the presumptions raised against him under Section 113A of the Evidence Act.
Having gone through the relevant facts and the reasonings of the trial court we
are not persuaded to take a different view.
25. In the result the
appeal must fail. We order accordingly. As a consequence, the bail bonds of the
appellant are cancelled. He be
18
taken into custody
forthwith to serve out the remaining part of the sentence as per law.
.…………………………………….J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
……………………………………..J.
[SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
New Delhi.
June 03, 2016.
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